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ON THE BANG-BANG TYPE NASH EQUILIBRIUM POINT FOR
MARKOVIAN NONZERO-SUM STOCHASTIC DIFFERENTIAL
GAME
SAID HAMADÈNE ∗ AND RUI MU †
Abstract. In this paper, we study a nonzero-sum stochastic differential game of bang-bang
type in the Markovian framework. We show the existence of a Nash equilibrium point for this game.
The main tool is the notion of backward stochastic differential equations which, in our case, are
multidimensional with discontinuous generators with respect to z component.
Key words. Nonzero-sum Stochastic Differential Games; Nash Equilibrium Point; Backward
Stochastic Differential Equations ; Bang-bang type control.
AMS subject classifications. 49N70; 49N90; 91A15.
1. Introduction. This paper is related to nonzero-sum stochastic differential
games (NZSDG, for short) of bang-bang type in the Markovian framework which we
describe below.
We consider the case of two players π1 and π2. If there are more than two players,
the adaptation is straightforward. The two players π1 and π2 act on a system through
two admissible controls u := (us)s≤T and v := (vs)s≤T which are adapted stochastic
processes, with values in compact metric spaces U and V , respectively. The dynamics
of the controlled system is given by a stochastic process (Xu,vs )s≤T , solution of the
following standard stochastic differential equation (SDE, for short):
(1.1) dXu,vs = Γ(s,X
u,v
s , us, vs)ds+ σ(s,X
u,v
s )dBs for s ≤ T, and X0 = x0
where B := (Bs)s≤T is a Brownian motion. Next with each player πi, i = 1, 2, is
associated a payoff Ji(u, v), i = 1, 2, given by:
(1.2) Ji(u, v) = E[gi(X
u,v
T )].
The objective is to find a pair (u∗, v∗) which satisfy
(1.3) J1(u
∗, v∗) ≥ J1(u, v∗) and J2(u∗, v∗) ≥ J2(u∗, v) for any pair (u, v).
As we can see, the payoff function of the player π1 (resp. π2) depends not only
on its own control u (resp. v) but also on the control used by the other player π2
(resp. π1). Therefore there is a game between the two players which is of cooperative
relationship. This kind of game is known as the nonzero-sum stochastic differential
game. The pair (u∗, v∗) of (1.3) is called a Nash equilibrium point (NEP, for short)
of the game. Its meaning is that when it is implemented by both players, then if
π1 (resp. π2) decides unilaterally to change a control while π2 (resp. π1) keeps v
∗
(resp. u∗) then her payoff J1(u, v∗) (resp. J2(u∗, v)) is lesser than J1(u∗, v∗) (resp.
J2(u
∗, v∗)), i.e., her action of unilateral deviation induces a penalty.
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In the case when J1(u, v)+J2(u, v) = 0, the game turns into the well-known zero-
sum differential game which is widely studied in the literature (see e.g. [7, 8, 9, 18, 19],
etc. and the references therein). On the other hand, if Xu,v does not depend on v
then the problem turns merely into a control problem. In this specific case, we know
that an optimal control exists and is of bang-bang type since it takes values only on
the boundaries of U according to the derivative of the value function of the control
problem. This is the consequence of the fact that the instantaneous reward in (1.2)
is null. So one would expect the same features of the NEP of this game if it exists.
The nonzero-sum differential game is also considered by several authors in the
literature, see eg. [4, 5, 10, 12, 31, 16, 20, 21, 22, 26, 27, 11], to name a few. There
are typically two approaches. One method is related to partial differential equation
(PDE) theory. Some of the results show that the payoff function of the game is the
unique viscosity solution of a related Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman-Isaacs equation, e.g.,
[26]. Other works make use of the Sobolev theory of PDEs (see [4, 5, 16, 27], etc.)
to deal with NZSDGs. Comparatively, another popular way to deal with stochastic
differential game is the backward stochastic differential equation (BSDE) approach
[20, 21, 22, 26], which characterizes the payoffs of the game through solutions of
associated BSDEs. However those BSDEs are of multidimensional type and usually
their generators are non-Lipschitz. Therefore proving that they have solutions is not
an easy task.
In the present article, we study the above NZSDG via the BSDE arguments in
the Markovian framework. For clarity reasons we consider a special game model in
assuming that:
(i) the process X of (1.1) is R-valued, and U = [0, 1], V = [−1, 1] ;
(ii) the drift Γ of (1.1) has the following structure:
Γ(t, x, u, v) = f(t, x) + u+ v.
The conditions on the functions f and gi, i = 1, 2, are rather weak since they are
related to measurability and growth conditions.
At the end of the paper we give hints which allow to generalize this setting
in several directions, especially if the dynamics contains a diffusion term and the
multidimensional case for the process Xu,v.
In this problem the main difficulty is lodged at the level of the main BSDE (2.11)
associated with this NZSDG. Once the existence of its solution is stated, it provides
the NEP of the game. As pointed out previously, this BSDE is of multidimensional
type (here of dimension two since there are two players) and whose generator is
discontinuous in z. The main challenge we overcome is to show that this BSDE has
a solution and then we constructed a NEP for the game defined by (1.1), (1.2) and
(i)-(ii) above. Like in the control framework, this NEP is of bang-bang type since
the payoffs have no instantaneous payoffs included. This is the main novelty of this
article. The closest work to ours is the one by P.Manucci [27], but this latter concerns
only diffusions in bounded domains and the requirements on the regularity of the data
are stronger than ours due to the method she employed based on PDEs in Sobolev
spaces.
This paper is organized as follows:
In Subsection 2.1, we introduce the game problem and some preliminaries. The
formulation we adopt is of weak type. Besides, for intuitive understanding, we work
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with a particular setting of controls and state process Xu,v. The extension to the
multidimensional situation obviously holds following the same ideas. The explicit form
of discontinuous controls, namely, bang-bang controls are presented in Subsection 2.2.
In Subsection 2.3, we give the main result (Theorem 2.6) of this work and some other
related important results. We first provide a link between the game problem and
Backward SDEs (Proposition 2.3). The payoff of the game can be characterized by
the initial value of the solution for an associated BSDE. Then, by Proposition 2.4,
we prove that the existence of a NEP for the game is equivalent to the existence of
a solution of a BSDE which is of multidimensional and with discontinuous generator
with respect to z. Finally, under some reasonable assumption, we provide the solution
of this special BSDE (Theorem 2.5). All the proofs are stated in Subsection 2.4. The
proofs of Propositions 2.3 and 2.4 are standard. For Theorem 2.5, the method is
mainly based on an approximating scheme. In Section 3, we investigate some possible
generalizations. The idea is the same with a bit modification which is indicated.
2. Bang-bang type NZSDG and multidimensional BSDEs with discon-
tinuous generators. In this section, we first deal with the bang-bang type nonzero-
sum stochastic differential game problem in 1-dimensional framework. A more general
setting will be given in the next section.
2.1. Statement of the problem. Let T > 0 be fixed and let (Ω,F ,P) be
a probability space, on which is defined a 1-dimensional standard Brownian motion
B := (Bt)t≤T . For t ≤ T , let us set Ft := σ(Bu, u ≤ t) and denote by (Ft)t≤T the
completion of (Ft)t≤T with the P-null sets of F . Next let P be the σ-algebra on
[0, T ]×Ω of Ft-progressively measurable sets. For a real constant p ≥ 1, we introduce
the following spaces:
• Lp = {ξ : FT -measurable and R-valued random variable s.t.E[|ξ|p] <∞};
• SpT (R) = {Y = (Ys)s∈[0,T ] : P-measurable, continuous and R-valued stochas-
tic process s.t. E[sups∈[0,T ] |Ys|p] <∞};
• HpT (R) = {Z = (Zs)s∈[0,T ] : P-measurable and R-valued stochastic process
s.t. E[(
∫ T
0
|Zs|2ds)p/2] <∞}.
We consider, in this article, the 2-player case which we describe accurately below.
The general multiple players case is a straightforward adaptation.
Let (t, x) ∈ [0, T ]×R and Xt,x be the stochastic process defined as follows:
(2.1) ∀s ≤ T, Xt,xs = x+ (Bs∨t −Bt).
Remark 2.1. Note that we consider a trivial situation for SDE (2.1) with an
identity diffusion process, just for easy understanding. The trick of the technique in
this article still valid for general diffusion process with appropriate properties. We will
introduce this point in Section 3.
Each player πi, i = 1, 2, has her own control. Let us denote next by U = [0, 1],
V = [−1, 1] those two compact subsets of R and M1 (resp. M2) the set of P-
measurable process u = (ut)t≤T (resp. v = (vt)t≤T ) on [0, T ] × Ω with value in U
(resp. V ). Hereafter, we call M := M1 ×M2 (resp. M1, resp. M2) the set of
admissible controls for the two players (resp. first player ; resp. second player).
Let f : (t, x) ∈ [0, T ]×R → R be a Borelian function. We will say that f is of
linear growth if there exists a constant C ≥ 0 such that for any (t, x) ∈ [0, T ]×R,
(2.2) |f(t, x)| ≤ C(1 + |x|).
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Next let Γ be the function such that for any (t, x, u, v) ∈ [0, T ] × R × U × V
associates Γ(t, x, u, v) = f(t, x) + u + v ∈ R. The function Γ stands for the drift of
the dynamics of the system when controlled by the two players πi, i = 1, 2. When f
is of linear growth, the function Γ is so since U and V are bounded sets.
Next for (u., v.) ∈ M, let Pu,vt,x be the positive measure on (Ω,F) defined as
follows:
(2.3) dPu,vt,x = ζT (Γ(., X.
t,x, u., v.))dP with ζs(Θ) := 1 +
∫ s
0
ΘrζrdBr, s ∈ [t, T ],
for any P-measurable R-valued process Θ := (Θs)s≤T . It follows from the uniform
linear growth property of Γ that Pu,vt,x is a probability on (Ω,F) (see Appendix A of
[14] or [25], pp.200). Then, by Girsanov’s Theorem ([17]), the process Bu,v = (Bs −∫ s
0
Γ(r,Xt,xr , ur, vr)dr)s≤T is a (Fs,Pu,vt,x )-Brownian motion and (Xt,xs )s≤T satisfies
the following SDE
(2.4) dXt,xs = Γ(s,X
t,x
s , us, vs)ds+ dB
u,v
s , ∀s ∈ [t, T ] and Xt,xs = x, s ∈ [0, t].
As a matter of fact, the process Xt,x is not adapted with respect to the filtration
generated by the Brownian motion Bu,v. Thereby, Xt,x is a weak solution for the
SDE (2.4). If the system starts from x0 ∈ R at t = 0 and is controlled by player π1
(resp. π2) with u. (resp. v.), the law of its dynamics is the same as the one of X
0,x0
under Pu,v0,x0 .
Once more let x0 ∈ R fixed. We will precise the payoffs of the players when they
implement the pair of strategies (u., v.). It is of terminal type and given, for player
π1 (resp. π2), by
J1(u, v) := E
u,v
0,x0
[g1(X
0,x0
T )] (resp. J2(u, v) := E
u,v
0,x0
[g2(X
0,x0
T )]),(2.5)
where:
(i) g1 and g2 are two Borel measurable functions from R to R which are of polynomial
growth, i.e., there exist non-negative constants C and γ ≥ 1 such that for any x ∈ R,
|g1(x)|+ |g2(x)| ≤ C(1 + |x|γ)(2.6)
(ii) For any fixed (t, x) ∈ [0, T ] × R, Eu,vt,x is the expectation under the probability
Pu,vt,x ; hereafter E
u,v
0,x(.) (resp. P
u,v
0,x) will be simply denoted by E
u,v
x (.) (resp. P
u,v
x ).
As we can see from (2.4) and (2.5), the choice of control of each player has
influence on the other one’s payoff through the state process X0,x0 under Pu,vx0 . What
we discussed here is a nonzero-sum stochastic differential game which means that the
two players are of cooperate relationship. Both of them want to reach the maximum
payoff. Therefore, naturally, we are concerned with the existence of a Nash equilibrium
point, which is a couple of controls (u∗, v∗) ∈ M, such that, for all (u, v) ∈M,
J1(u
∗, v∗) ≥ J1(u, v∗) and J2(u∗, v∗) ≥ J2(u∗, v).
This means that when the strategy (u∗, v∗) is implemented by the players, one who
makes unilaterally the decision to deviate or to change a strategy, while the other one
keeps its own choice, is penalized. 
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2.2. Bang-bang type control. As pointed out in (2.5), there are no instanta-
neous payoffs in J1 and J2. Therefore, in comparison with optimal control which is a
particular case of our problem (see e.g. [2, 3, 13, 28]), the equilibrium point of this
game, if exists, should be of bang-bang type, i.e., the optimal control u∗ (resp.v∗) will
jump between the two bounds of the value set U (resp.V ).
To proceed, let H1 and H2 be the Hamiltonian functions of this game problem,
i.e., the functions (which do not depend on ω) defined from [0, T ]×R ×R × U × V
into R by:
H1(t, x, p, u, v) := pΓ(t, x, u, v) = p(f(t, x) + u+ v);
H2(t, x, q, u, v) := qΓ(t, x, u, v) = q(f(t, x) + u+ v).
Next let ǫ1 and ǫ2 be two arbitrary elements of U and V respectively. Let u¯ and
v¯ be two functions defined on R× U and R× V , valued on U and V respectively, as
follows: ∀p, q ∈ R,
(2.7) u¯(p, ǫ1) =


1, p > 0,
ǫ1, p = 0,
0, p < 0,
and v¯(q, ǫ2) =


1, q > 0,
ǫ2, q = 0,
−1, q < 0.
Then, we can easily check that u¯ and v¯ satisfy the generalized Isaacs’ condition which
reads as follows: ∀ (t, x, p, q, u, v) ∈ [0, T ]×R ×R× U × V ,
(2.8)
{
H∗1 (t, x, p, q, ǫ2) := H1(t, x, p, u¯(p, ǫ1), v¯(q, ǫ2)) ≥ H1(t, x, p, u, v¯(q, ǫ2)) and
H∗2 (t, x, p, q, ǫ1) := H2(t, x, q, u¯(p, ǫ1), v¯(q, ǫ2)) ≥ H2(t, x, q, u¯(p, ǫ1), v).
Remark 2.2. Let us notice that the function H∗1 (resp. H
∗
2 ) does not depend on
ǫ1 (resp. ǫ2) since, pu¯(p, ǫ1) = p ∨ 0 (resp. qv¯(q, ǫ2) = |q|) does not depend on ǫ1
(resp. ǫ2). Besides, they are discontinuous w.r.t. (p, q) since v¯ and u¯ are so.
We next give the main result of this article without proofs for intuitive under-
standing. All the proofs are given in Subsection 2.4.
2.3. Main result. As in several papers on the same subject ([14, 20, 23], etc.),
we will adopt the BSDE approach in order to show that this particular nonzero-sum
stochastic differential game has a Nash equilibrium point. For sake of clarity, in this
subsection we give the main result and the intermediary ones which we need. We
collect all their proofs in the next subsection. To begin with, the following result
characterizes the payoffs (2.5) through a solution of a multidimensional BSDE.
Proposition 2.3. Assume that (2.2) and (2.6) are satisfied. Then for all (u, v) ∈
M and i = 1, 2, there exists a unique pair of P-measurable processes
(Y i;x0;u,v, Zi;x0;u,v), with values in R×R, such that: For i = 1, 2,
(i) for all constant q ≥ 1,
(2.9) Eu,vx0
[
sup
s∈[0,T ]
|Y i;x0;u,vs |q + (
∫ T
0
|Zi;x0;u,vs |2ds)
q
2
]
<∞.
(ii)
(2.10){ −dY i;x0;u,vt = Hi(s,X0,x0s , Zi;x0;u,vs , us, vs)ds− Zi;x0;u,vs dBs, s ≤ T ;
Y i;x0;u,vT = gi(X
0,x0
T ).
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Moreover Y i;x0;u,v0 = Ji(u, v). 
The following result is a verification theorem for the existence of NEP of the game
of bang-bang type.
Proposition 2.4. Assume that (2.2) and (2.6) are satisfied. Besides, suppose
that there exist two deterministic functions η1, η2 and stochastic processes (Y 1, Z1),
(Y 2, Z2) and θ, ϑ such that:
(i) (a) θ (resp. ϑ) is a P-measurable process with values in U (resp. V ) and (Y 1, Z1)
and (Y 2, Z2) are two couples of P-measurable processes R1+1-valued which
satisfy:
(b) for i = 1, 2 P-a.s. (Zis(ω))s≤T is ds-square integrable and for all s ≤ T ,
(2.11)
{
−dY 1s = H∗1 (s,X0,x0s , Z1s , Z2s , ϑs)ds− Z1sdBs, Y 1T = g1(X0,x0T );
−dY 2s = H∗2 (s,X0,x0s , Z1s , Z2s , θs)ds− Z2sdBs, Y 2T = g2(X0,x0T ).
(ii) η1 and η2 are two deterministic measurable functions with polynomial growth
from [0, T ]×R to R such that P-a.s., ∀s ≤ T , Y is = ηi(s,X0,x0s ).
Then, the pair of controls (u¯(Z1s , θs), v¯(Z
2
s , ϑs))s≤T is a bang-bang type Nash equilib-
rium point of the nonzero-sum stochastic differential game. 
Finally since the diffusion coefficient in equation (2.1) is equal to the identity and
in using a result by El-Karoui et al. [15] which allows the representation of solutions
of BSDEs through deterministic functions, in the markovian case of randomness,
we prove the existence of processes and deterministic functions which satisfy the
requirements of Proposition 2.4. The main difficulty relies on the discontinuity of the
generator H∗1 (resp. H
∗
2 ) w.r.t. (p, q) which comes from the discontinuity of v¯ (resp.
u¯) on q = 0 (resp. p = 0). However we can overcome this difficulty and we have:
Theorem 2.5. Assume that f and gi, i = 1, 2, satisfy to (2.2) and (2.6) respec-
tively. Then there exist η1, η2, (Y 1, Z1), (Y 2, Z2) and θ, ϑ which satisfy (i),(a)-(b)
and (ii) of Proposition 2.4.
As a consequence of Theorem 2.5 and Proposition 2.4, we obtain the main result
of this article.
Theorem 2.6. The pair (u¯(Z1s , θs), v¯(Z
2
s , ϑs))s≤T of M is a bang-bang type Nash
equilibrium point for the nonzero-sum stochastic differential game defined by (2.1),
(2.3) and (2.5).
2.4. Proofs.
2.4.1. Pre-results. We would like to introduce first two estimates about the
process Xt,x defined in (2.1) which will be used in order to prove the above results.
They are related to moments of Xt,x under the probabilities P and Pu,v, (u, v) ∈M
(see. Karatzas, I.1991 [25], pp.306). Indeed we have:
(2.12) ∀q ∈ [1,∞), E[(sup
s≤T
|Xt,xs |)q
] ≤ C(1 + |x|q)
and for any (u, v) ∈ M
(2.13) ∀q ∈ [1,∞), Eu,vt,x
[
(sup
s≤T
|Xt,xs |)q
] ≤ C(1 + |x|q).
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Finally let us recall the following important result by U.G.Hausmann (see Theorem
2.2, pp.14 [24]) related to the integrability of the exponential local martingale defined
by (2.3).
Lemma 2.7. ([24], pp.14) Let Θ be a P ⊗ B(R)-measurable application from
[0, T ] × Ω × R to R which is of uniformly linear growth, that is, P-a.s. ∀(s, x) ∈
[0, T ] × R, |Θ(s, ω, x)| ≤ C0(1 + |x|). Then, there exist constants p ∈ (1, 2) and C,
where p depends only on C0 while the constant C, depends only on p, but not on Θ,
such that:
E
[(
ζT {Θ(s,Xt,xs )}
)p]
≤ C,
where the process ζT (.) is the density function defined by (2.3).
As a by-product we have:
Corollary 2.8. For any admissible control (u, v) ∈ M and (t, x) ∈ [0, T ]×R,
there exists a constant p ∈ (1, 2) such that:
E
[(
ζT {Γ(s,Xt,xs , us, vs)}
)p]
≤ C.
2.4.2. Proof of Proposition 2.3. We will prove this Proposition by construct-
ing the candidate solution of BSDE (2.10) directly. Then we check by Itô’s formula
that, the process defined is exactly the solution we anticipate. In this proof, Corollary
2.8 plays an important role. Let us illustrate it for player π1. The same can be done
for player π2.
For simplicity, only in this proof, we use the notation (Y u,v, Zu,v) instead of
(Y 1;x0;u,v, Z1;x0;u,v).
For any (u, v) ∈M, let us define the process (Y u,vs )s≤T as follows:
Y u,vs := E
u,v
x0 [g1(X
0,x0
T )|Fs], ∀s ≤ T.(2.14)
This process is well defined by noticing that, for any constant q ≥ 1, we have
Eu,vx0 [|g1(X0,x0T )|q] ≤ CEu,vx0 [C(1 + sups≤T |X0,x0s |qγ)] < ∞ which is obtained by (2.6)
and (2.13). For writing convenience, we denote by ζs, the function
ζs(Γ(., X
0,x0
. , u., v.)) as mentioned in (2.3). Therefore (2.14) can be transformed into:
Y u,vs = ζ
−1
s E[ζT · g1(X0,x0T )|Fs], ∀s ≤ T.
In the following, we show that ζT · g1(X0,x0T ) ∈ Lq¯ for some q¯ ∈ (1, 2). Indeed,
according to Corollary 2.8, there exists some p0 ∈ (1, 2), such that ζT ∈ Lp0(dP).
Therefore, for any q¯ ∈ (1, p0), Young’s inequality leads to:
E[|ζT · g1(X0,x0T )|q¯] ≤ q¯p0E[|ζT |p0 ] +
p0−q¯
p0
E[|g1(X0,x0T )|q¯·
p0
p0−q¯ ],
which is obviously finite by the polynomial growth of g1 and (2.12). Therefore the
process Y u,v is defined. On the other hand, by Doob’s inequality, (2.6) and estimate
(2.13) we have:
(2.15) ∀q > 1,Eu,vx0 [sup
s≤T
|Y u,vs |q] ≤ CEu,vx0 [|g1(X0,x0T )|q] ≤ C(1 + |x0|q).
Next thanks to representation Theorem of martingales ([32], pp.199) applied to
the process (E[ζT · g1(X0,x0T )|Fs])s≤T , there exists a P-measurable and R-valued pro-
cess (∆s)s≤T which satisfies E[(
∫ T
0
|∆s|2ds) q¯2 ] <∞ and
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Y u,vs = ζ
−1
s {E[ζT · g1(X0,x0T )] +
∫ s
0
∆rdBr} := ζ−1s Rs, ∀s ≤ T,
with Rs := E[ζT · g1(X0,x0T )|Fs] = E[ζT · g1(X0,x0T )] +
∫ s
0
∆rdBr. Next let us set
(2.16) Zu,vs := −ζ−1s
{
RsΓ(s,X
0,x0
s , us, vs)−∆s
}
, s ≤ T.
As for any s ∈ [0, T ],
dζs = ζs · Γ(s,X0,x0s , us, vs)dBs
then by Itô’s formula applied to ζ−1R, one can easily check that (Y u,v, Zu,v) verifies
(2.10) for i = 1. The same happens for i = 2.
Now for any (u, v) ∈ M and s ≤ T , if (Bu,vs )s≤T is the Brownian motion under
Pu,vx0 , we then deduce from (2.10) that
−dY i;x0;u,vs = −Zi;x0;u,vs dBu,vs , Y i;x0;u,vT = gi(X0,x0T )
and Y i;x0;u,v0 = E
u,v
x0 [gi(X
0,x0
T ] = Ji(u, v) since F0 is the trivial σ-algebra completed
with the P-null sets of F and taking into account that P and Pu,vx0 are equivalent
probabilities. Therefore taking into account of (2.15) and using the Burkholder-Davis-
Gundy inequality we have
∀q > 1,Eu,vx0 [(
∫ T
0
|Zi;x0;u,vr |2dr)
q
2 ] <∞.
This and (2.15) imply the estimate (2.9) of Proposition 2.3 for q > 1. Finally for q = 1,
(2.9) is obviously true since it is valid for any q > 1. The proof of the Proposition 2.3
is completed. 
2.4.3. Proof of Proposition 2.4. For s ≤ T , let us set u¯s = u¯(Z1s , θs) and
v¯s = v¯(Z
2
s , ϑs), then (u¯, v¯) ∈ M. On the other hand, thanks to Proposition 2.3, we
obviously have Y 10 = J1(u¯, v¯).
Next let u be an arbitrary element of M1 and let us show that Y 1 ≥ Y 1;x0;u,v¯,
which yields Y 10 = J1(u¯, v¯) ≥ Y 1;x0;u,v¯0 = J1(u, v¯).
The control (u, v¯) is admissible and thanks to Proposition 2.3, there exists a pair
of P-measurable processes (Y 1;x0;u,v¯, Z1;x0;u,v¯) such that for any q > 1,
(2.17)

Eu,v¯x0
[
sup
0≤s≤T
|Y 1;x0;u,v¯s |q +
( ∫ T
0
|Z1;x0;u,v¯s |2ds
) q
2
]
<∞ ;
Y 1;x0;u,v¯s = g1(X
0,x0
T ) +
∫ T
s
H1(r,X
0,x0
r , Z
1;x0;u,v¯
r , ur, v¯r)dr −
∫ T
s
Z1;x0;u,v¯r dBr,
∀s ≤ T.
Afterwards, we aim to compare Y 1 in (2.11) and Y 1;x0;u,v¯ in (2.17). So let us denote
by
△Y = Y 1;x0;u,v¯ − Y 1 and △Z = Z1;x0;u,v¯ − Z1.
For k ≥ 0, we define the stopping time τk as follows:
τk := inf{s ≥ 0, |△Ys|+
∫ s
0
|△Zr|2dr ≥ k} ∧ T.
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The sequence of stopping times (τk)k≥0 is of stationary type and converges to T . Next
applying Itô-Meyer formula to |(△Y )+|q (q > 1) (see Theorem 71, P. Protter, [30],
pp.221), between s ∧ τk and τk, we obtain: ∀s ≤ T ,
(2.18)
|(△Ys∧τk)+|q + c(q)
∫ τk
s∧τk
|(△Yr)+|q−21△Yr>0|△Zr|2dr
= |(△Yτk)+|q + q
∫ τk
s∧τk
|(△Yr)+|q−11△Yr>0
[
H1(r,X
0,x0
r , Z
1;x0;u,v¯
r , ur, v¯r)−
H1(r,X
0,x0
r , Z
1
r , u¯r, v¯r)
]
dr − q
∫ τk
s∧τk
|(△Yr)+|q−11△Yr>0△ZrdBr
where c(q) = 12q(q − 1). Besides for any s ≤ T ,
H1(s,X
0,x0
s , Z
1;x0;u,v¯
s , us, v¯s)−H1(s,X0,xs , Z1s , u¯s, v¯s) =
H1(s,X
0,x0
s , Z
1;x0;u,v¯
s , us, v¯s)−H1(s,X0,x0s , Z1s , us, v¯s)
+H1(s,X
0,x0
s , Z
1
s , us, v¯s)−H1(s,X0,x0s , Z1s , u¯s, v¯s)
Considering now the generalized Isaacs’ condition (2.8), we have
H1(s,X
0,x0
s , Z
1
s , us, v¯s)−H1(s,X0,x0s , Z1s , u¯s, v¯s) ≤ 0, ∀s ≤ T.
Additionally
H1(s,X
0,x0
s , Z
1;x0;u,v¯
s , us, v¯s)−H1(s,X0,x0s , Z1s , us, v¯s) = △ZsΓ(s,X0,x0s , us, v¯s).
Thus equation (2.18) can be simplified into: ∀s ∈ [0, T ],
|(△Ys∧τk)+|q + c(q)
∫ τk
s∧τk
|(△Yr)+|q−21△Yr>0|△Zr|2dr
≤ |(△Yτk)+|q + q
∫ τk
s∧τk
|(△Yr)+|q−11△Yr>0△ZrΓ(r,X0,x0r , ur, v¯r)dr
− q
∫ τk
s∧τk
|(△Yr)+|q−11△Yr>0△ZrdBr
= |(△Yτk)+|q − q
∫ τk
s∧τk
|(△Yr)+|q−11△Yr>0△ZrdBu,v¯r ,
where Bu,v¯ = (Bs −
∫ s
0 Γ(r,X
0,x0
r , ur, v¯r)dr)s≤T is an (Fs,Pu,v¯x0 )-Brownian motion.
Then for any s ≤ T ,
|(△Ys∧τk)+|q ≤ |(△Yτk)+|q − q
∫ τk
s∧τk
|(△Yr)+|q−11△Yr>0△ZrdBu,v¯r .
By definition of the stopping time τk, we have
Eu,v¯x0
[ ∫ τk
s∧τk |(△Yr)+|q−11△Yr>0△ZrdBu,v¯r
]
= 0.
Thus for any s ≤ T ,
Eu,v¯x0
[|(△Ys∧τk)+|q] ≤ Eu,v¯x0 [|(Y 1;x0;u,v¯τk − Y 1τk)+|q].(2.19)
Next taking into account (2.13) and the fact that Y 1 has a representation through
X0,x0 and η1(s, y), (s, y) ∈ [0, T ]×R, a deterministic function with polynomial growth,
we have
(2.20) Eu,v¯x0
[
sup
s≤T
(|Y 1s |+ |Y 1;x0;u,v¯s |)q
]
<∞
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As the sequence ((Y 1;x0;u,v¯τk − Y 1τk)+)k≥0 converges to 0 when k →∞, Pu,v¯x0 -a.s., since
limk→∞ Y 1;x0;u,v¯τk = limk→∞ Y
1
τk
= g1(X
0,x
T ) P
u,v¯
x0 -a.s.. Then it converges also to 0
in L1(dPu,v¯x0 ) thanks to (2.20). Take now k → ∞ on (2.19), it follows from Fatou’s
Lemma that:
Eu,v¯x0
[
(△Ys)+
]
= 0, ∀s ≤ T,
which implies that Y 1 ≥ Y 1;x0;u,v¯, P-a.s., since the probabilities Pu,v¯x0 and P are
equivalent. Thus Y 10 = J
1(u¯, v¯) ≥ Y 1;x0;u,v¯0 = J1(u, v¯).
Similarly, we can show that, Y 20 = J
2(u¯, v¯) ≥ Y 2;x0;u¯,v0 = J2(u¯, v) for arbitrary
v ∈ M2. Henceforth (u¯, v¯) is a Nash equilibrium point for the NZSDG. 
2.4.4. Proof of Theorem 2.5. The proof will be split into several steps. Firstly,
we construct an approximating sequence of BSDEs with continuous Lipschitz gener-
ators by smoothing the functions u¯ and v¯. Next we provide appropriate uniform
estimates of the solutions of the approximating scheme. Finally we show that the
approximating scheme contains at least a convergent subsequence which provides the
stochastic processes and deterministic functions verifying the requirements of Propo-
sition 2.4.
Step 1 : Approximating scheme.
At the beginning of this proof, we would like to clarify that the functions p ∈
R 7→ pu¯(p, ǫ1) and q ∈ R 7→ qv¯(q, ǫ2) are uniformly Lipschitz for any ǫ1 and ǫ2, since
pu¯(p, ǫ1) = pu¯(p, 0) = supu∈U pu and qv¯(q, ǫ2) = qv¯(q, 0) = supv∈V qv. Hereafter
u¯(p, 0) (resp. v¯(q, 0)) will be simply denoted by u¯(p) (resp. v¯(q)).
Next for integer n ≥ 1, let u¯n and v¯n be the functions defined as follows:
u¯n(p) =


0 if p ≤ −1/n,
1 if p ≥ 0,
np+ 1 if p ∈ (−1/n, 0),
and v¯n(q) =


−1 if q ≤ −1/n,
1 if q ≥ 1/n,
nq if q ∈ (−1/n, 1/n).
Note that u¯n and v¯n are Lipschitz in p and q respectively. Roughly speaking, they are
the approximations of u¯ and v¯. Below, let Φn be the truncation function x ∈ R 7→
Φn(x) = (x ∧ n) ∨ (−n) ∈ R, which is bounded by n. Now for (t, x) ∈ [0, T ]×R and
n ≥ 1, we consider the following BSDE of dimension two, with Lipschitz generator:
For any s ≤ T ,
(2.21)


−dY 1,n;t,xs = {Φn(Z1,n;t,xr )Φn(f(r,Xt,xr )) + Φn(Z1,n;t,xr u¯(Z1,n;t,xr ))+
Φn(Z
1,n;t,x
r )v¯
n(Z2,n;t,xr )}dr − Z1,n;t,xr dBr, Y 1,n;t,xT = g1(Xt,xT );
−dY 2,n;t,xs = {Φn(Z2,n;t,xr )Φn(f(r,Xt,xr )) + Φn(Z2,n;t,xr v¯(Z2,n;t,xr ))+
Φn(Z
2,n;t,x
r )u¯
n(Z1,n;t,xr )}dr − Z2,n;t,xr dBr, Y 2,n;t,xT = g2(Xt,xT ).
From Pardoux-Peng’s result ([29]), for any n ≥ 1, this equation has a unique solution
(Y i,n;t,x, Zi,n;t,x) ∈ S2T (R) × H2T (R), i = 1, 2. Taking account of the result by El-
Karoui et al.([15], pp.46, Theorem 4.1), there exist measurable deterministic functions
ηi,n and ςi,n, i = 1, 2 and n ≥ 1, defined on [0, T ]×R and R-valued such that:
(2.22) ∀s ∈ [t, T ], Y i,n;t,xs = ηi,n(s,Xt,xs ) and Zi,n;t,xs = ςi,n(s,Xt,xs ).
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Moreover, for n ≥ 1 and i = 1, 2, the functions ηi,n verify:
(2.23) ∀(t, x) ∈ [0, T ]×R, ηi,n(t, x) = E[gi(Xt,xT )] +
∫ T
t
Hni (r,X
t,x
r )dr]
with, for any (s, x) ∈ [0, T ]×R,
(2.24)


Hn1 (s, x) = Φn(ς
1,n(s, x))Φn(f(s, x)) + Φn
(
ς1,n(s, x)u¯(ς1,n(s, x))
)
+
+Φn(ς
1,n(s, x))v¯n(ς2,n(s, x));
Hn2 (s, x) = Φn(ς
2,n(s, x))Φn(f(s, x)) + Φn
(
ς2,n(s, x)v¯(ς2,n(s, x))
)
+
+Φn(ς
2,n(s, x))u¯n(ς1,n(s, x)).
Step 2 : Estimates for processes (Y i,n;t,x, Zi,n;t,x), i = 1, 2.
In order to show the needed uniform estimates for Y i,n;t,x of BSDE (2.21), we
use comparison. For that let us consider the following BSDE: For i = 1, 2 and any
s ∈ [0, T ],
(2.25) Y¯ i,ns = gi(X
t,x
T ) +
∫ T
s
{Φn(C(1 + |Xt,xr |))|Z¯i,nr |+ C|Z¯i,nr |}dr −
∫ T
s
Z¯i,nr dBr,
where the constant C is the one such that the generators (Hni (s,X
t,x
s ))s≤T satisfy
(2.26) ∀s ≤ T, |Hni (s,Xt,xs )| ≤ Φn(C(1 + |Xt,xs |))|Zi,n;t,xs |+ C|Zi,n;t,xs |.
This constant exists since f is of linear growth and u¯, v¯, u¯n and v¯n are uniformly
bounded. Observing now that the application z ∈ R 7→ Φn(C(1 + |Xt,xr |))|z| +
C|z| is Lipschitz continuous, therefore the solution (Y¯ i,n, Z¯i,n) of the above BSDE
(2.25) exists in the space S2T (R)×H2T (R) and is unique. Note that we have omitted
the dependence w.r.t (t, x) of (Y¯ i,n, Z¯i,n) in order to alleviate notations as there is
no possible confusion. On the other hand by the standard comparison theorem of
solutions of BSDEs ([15], pp.46, Theorem 4.1) one has
(2.27) Y¯ i,n ≥ Y i,n;t,x,P− a.s.
Next provided that we show uniform estimates, w.r.t. n, for Y¯ i,n, then estimates for
Y i,n;t,x will be an immediate consequence. Below, we will focus on the properties of
Y¯ i,n.
Using again the result by El Karoui et al. yields that, there exist deterministic
measurable functions η¯i,n : [0, T ]×R→ R such that, for any s ∈ [t, T ],
(2.28) Y¯ i,ns = η¯
i,n(s,Xt,xs ), i = 1, 2.
Next let us consider the process
Bi,n = (Bs−
∫ s
0 [Φn(C(1+ |Xt,xr |))+C]sign(Z¯i,nr )dr)s≤T , i = 1, 2, which is, thanks to
Girsanov’s Theorem, a Brownian motion under the probability Pi,n on (Ω,F) whose
density with respect to P is ζT {[Φn(C(1 + |Xt,xs |)) + C]sign(Z¯i,ns )} where for any
z ∈ R, sign(z) = 1{|z|6=0} z|z| and ζT (.) is defined by (2.3). Then the BSDE (2.25) will
be simplified into,
Y¯ i,ns = gi(X
t,x
T )−
∫ T
s
Z¯i,nr dB
i,n
r , s ≤ T, i = 1, 2.
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In view of (2.28), we obtain,
η¯i,n(t, x) = Ei,n[gi(X
t,x
T )|Ft], i = 1, 2,
where Ei,n is the expectation under probability Pi,n. By taking the expectation on
both sides of the above equation under the probability Pi,n and considering η¯i,n(t, x)
is deterministic, we arrive at,
η¯i,n(t, x) = Ei,n[gi(X
t,x
T )], i = 1, 2.
As the functions gi, i = 1, 2, verify the polynomial growth condition (2.6) and for any
s ≤ T ,
|{Φn(C(1 + |Xt,xs |)) + C}sign(Z¯i,ns )| ≤ C¯(1 + |Xt,xs |
then by estimate (2.13) we have, for some constant λ ≥ 0 and C a constant which
does not depend on n,
|η¯i,n(t, x)| ≤ C(1 + |x|λ).
Therefore by (2.27) we obtain ηi,n(t, x) ≤ C(1+ |x|λ), for any (t, x) ∈ [0, T ]×R. In a
similar way, we can show that ηi,n(t, x) ≥ −C(1+ |x|λ), (t, x) ∈ [0, T ]×R. Therefore,
ηi,n, i = 1, 2 are of polynomial growth with respect to (t, x) uniformly in n.
To conclude this step, we have the following results: There exists a constant C
independent of n and t, x such that, for (t, x) ∈ [0, T ]×R, i = 1, 2,
(2.29)

(a) |ηi,n(t, x)| ≤ C(1 + |x|λ), for any λ ≥ 0;
(b) by the combination of (a), (2.12) with (2.22), it holds:
∀α ≥ 1, E[ sup
s∈[t,T ]
|Y i,n;t,xs |α] ≤ C ;
(c) for any (t, x) ∈ [0, T ]×R, E[
∫ T
t
|Zi,n;t,xs |2ds] ≤ C which is a
straightforward result by using Itô’s formula with (Y i,n;t,x)2 and using (b).
Step 3 : Convergence of a subsequence of (Y i,n;0,x, Zi,n;0,x)n≥1, i = 1, 2.
First let us define on R the measure µ(0, x0; s, dy) as the law under P of X
0,x0
s ,
i.e., µ(0, x0; s, dy) := P(X
0,x0
s ∈ dy) = 1√2πse−
(y−x0)
2
2s dy for any s ∈ (0, T ].
Let q ∈ (1, 2) be fixed. We are going to show that the sequence (Hni (s, y))n≥1
belongs to Lq([0, T ]×R;µ(0, x0; s, dy)ds), i = 1, 2. Actually,
E[
∫ T
0
|Hni (s,X0,x0s )|qds] =
∫
[0,T ]×R
|Hni (s, y)|qµ(0, x0; s, dy)ds
≤ CE[
∫ T
0
|Zi,n;0,x0s |q(1 + |X0,xs |q)ds]
≤ C{E[
∫ T
0
|Zi,n;0,x0s |2ds] +E[1 + sup
s∈[0,T ]
|X0,x0s |
2q
2−q ]} ≤ C
(2.30)
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(C is a generic constant whose value may change from line to line). The last inequality
is obtained from the fact that E[
∫ T
0
|Zi,n;0,x0s |2ds] ≤ C and estimate (2.12). As a
result, there exists a subsequence {nk} (still denoted by {n} for simplification) and
two B([0, T ]×R)-measurable deterministic functions Hi(s, y), i = 1, 2, such that,
(2.31) Hni ⇀ Hi weakly in L
q([0, T ]×R;µ(0, x0; s, dy)ds).
Next we focus on passing from the weak convergence to strong sense convergence by
proving that (ηi,n(t, x))n≥1 defined in (2.23) is a Cauchy sequence for each (t, x) ∈
[0, T ] × R, i = 1, 2. Let (t, x) be fixed in [0, T ) × R (w.l.o.g we assume t < T ),
δ > 0, k, n and m ≥ 1 be integers. From (2.23), we have,
|ηi,n(t, x) − ηi,m(t, x)| =
∣∣E[∫ T
t
Hni (s,X
t,x
s )−Hmi (s,Xt,xs )ds]
∣∣
≤
∣∣E[∫ t+δ
t
Hni (s,X
t,x
s )−Hmi (s,Xt,xs )ds]
∣∣
+
∣∣E[∫ T
t+δ
(Hni (s,X
t,x
s )−Hmi (s,Xt,xs )) · 1{|Xt,xs |≤k}ds]
∣∣
+
∣∣E[∫ T
t+δ
(Hni (s,X
t,x
s )−Hmi (s,Xt,xs )) · 1{|Xt,xs |>k}ds]
∣∣.
(2.32)
We first deal with the first term of the right-hand side of (2.32). By Hölder’s inequality,
definition of Hni (s,X
t,x
s ) and (2.29) we have∣∣E[∫ t+δ
t
Hni (s,X
t,x
s )−Hmi (s,Xt,xs )ds]
∣∣
≤E[∫ t+δt |Hni (s,Xt,xs )−Hmi (s,Xt,xs )|ds]
≤ CE[∫ t+δ
t
|Zi,n;t,xs |(1 + |Xt,xs |)ds]
≤ Cδ 14 {E[∫ T
t
|Zi,n;t,xs |2ds]}
1
2 {E[∫ T
t
(1 + |Xt,xs |)4ds]}
1
4
≤ Cδ 14 .
We now focus on the third term of the right hand-side of inequality (2.32). In the
same way as previous we have:∣∣E [∫ Tt+δ(Hni (s,Xt,xs )−Hmi (s,Xt,xs )) · 1{|Xt,xs |>k}ds]∣∣
≤ E[∫ Tt+δ |Hni (s,Xt,xs )−Hmi (s,Xt,xs )| · 1{|Xt,xs |>k}ds]
≤ C{E[∫ T
t+δ
1{|Xt,xs |>k}ds]}
1
4 {E[∫ T
t
|Zi,n;t,xs |2ds]}
1
2 {E[∫ T
t
(1 + |Xt,xs |)4ds]}
1
4
≤ Ck− 14
by using Markov inequality. Finally we deal with the second term of the right-hand
side of (2.32). By using the law of Xt,xs we have
E[
∫ T
t+δ
(Hni (s,X
t,x
s )−Hmi (s,Xt,xs )) · 1{|Xt,xs |≤k}ds]
=
∫
R
∫ T
t+δ
(Hni (s, y)−Hmi (s, y))1{|y|≤k}
1√
2π(s− t)e
− (y−x)2
2(s−t) dsdy
=
∫
R
∫ T
t+δ
(Hni (s, y)−Hmi (s, y))1{|y|≤k}Φt,x,x0(s, y)
1√
2πs
e−
(y−x0)
2
2s dy(2.33)
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where
Φt,x,x0(s, y) =
√
s√
s− te
− (y−x)2t
2(s−t)
+
(y−x0)
2
2s
which is bounded when s ∈ [t+ δ, T ] and |y| ≤ k and then
Φt,x,x0(s, y)1[t+δ,T ]×[−k,k](s, y) belongs L
q¯([0, T ] × R;µ(0, x0; s, dy)ds) with q¯ is the
conjugate of q. Now as the sequence of functions (Hni )n≥1 converges weakly in
Lq([0, T ]×R;µ(0, x0; s, dy)ds) then
E[
∫ T
t+δ
(Hni (s,X
t,x
s )−Hmi (s,Xt,xs )) · 1{|Xt,xs |≤k}ds]
=
∫
R
∫ T
t+δ
(Hni (s, y)−Hmi (s, y))1{|y|≤k}Φt,x,x0(s, y) 1√2πse−
(y−x0)
2
2s dy
→ 0 as n,m→∞.
Henceforth for i = 1, 2, and any (t, x) ∈ [0, T ] × R, the sequences (ηi,n(t, x))n≥1 is
of Cauchy type and then converges to a deterministic measurable function ηi(t, x).
Additionally from the uniform polynomial growth of ηi,n (see (a) of Step 2) we deduce
that ηi is also of polynomial growth, i.e.,
(2.34) ∀(t, x) ∈ [0, T ]×R, |ηi(t, x)| ≤ C(1 + |x|λ) (λ ≥ 0).
Next it turns out that, for i = 1, 2 and any s ∈ [0, T ],
lim
n→∞
Y i,n;0,x0s (ω) = η
i(s,X0,x0s (ω)) and |Y i,n;0,x0s (ω)| ≤ C(1 + |X0,x0s (ω)|λ), P− a.s.
Setting Y i := (ηi(s,X0,x0s ))s≤T , then by Lebesgue’s dominated convergence theorem
it holds
E[
∫ T
0
|Y i,n;0,x0s − Y is |αds]→ 0, as n→∞ for any α ≥ 1 (i = 1, 2).(2.35)
It remains to show the convergence of sequences ((Zi,n;0,x0s )s≤T )n≥1, i = 1, 2.
Taking Itô’s formula with (Y i,n;0,x0 − Y i,m;0,x0)2 and considering (2.2), we get:
|Y i,n;0,x0s − Y i,m;0,x0s |2 +
∫ T
s
|Zi,n;0,x0r − Zi,m;0,x0r |2ds
≤ 2
∫ T
s
C|Y i,n;0,x0r − Y i,m;0,x0r |(1 + |X0,x0r |)(|Zi,n;0,x0r |+ |Zi,m;0,x0r |)dr
− 2
∫ T
s
(Y i,n;0,x0r − Y i,m;0,x0r )(Zi,n;0,x0r − Zi,m;0,x0r )dBr, ∀s ≤ T.(2.36)
Since for any a, b, c ∈ R and for any ǫ > 0, |abc| ≤ ǫ22 a2 + ǫ
4
4 b
4 + 14ǫ8 c
4, we then have:
∀s ≤ T ,
|Y i,n;0,x0s − Y i,m;0,x0s |2 +
∫ T
s
|Zi,n;0,x0r − Zi,m;0,x0r |2dr
≤ C{ ǫ2
2
∫ T
s
(|Zi,n;0,x0r |+ |Zi,m;0,x0r |)2dr +
ǫ4
4
∫ T
s
(1 + |X0,x0r |)4dr
+
1
4ǫ8
∫ T
s
|Y i,n;0,x0r − Y i,m;0,x0r |4dr
}
− 2
∫ T
s
(Y i,n;0,x0r − Y i,m;0,x0r )(Zi,n;0,x0r − Zi,m;0,x0r )dBr.(2.37)
USING SIAM’S LATEX MACROS 15
Since ǫ is arbitrary, taking now s = 0, expectation on both hand-sides and the limit
w.r.t. n,m, combining with (2.35), (2.12), (2.29)-(c) yields that,
(2.38) lim sup
n,m→∞
E[
∫ T
0
|Zi,n;0,x0r − Zi,n;0,x0r |2dr]→ 0, i = 1, 2.
Consequently, for i = 1, 2, the sequence (Zi,n;0,x0 = (ςi,n(t,X0,xt ))t≤T )n≥1 is conver-
gent in H2T (R) to a process Zi which belongs also to H2T (R). On the other hand one
can substract a subsequence which we still denote by {n} such that (Zi,n;0,x0s )n≥1 →
Zis, ds⊗ dP-a.e. and supn≥1 |Zi,n;0,x0s | belongs to L2([0, T ]×R, ds⊗ dP).
Next going back to inequality (2.37), taking the supremum on interval [0, T ] and
using BDG’s inequality, we deduce that,
E
[
sup
s∈[0,T ]
|Y i,n;0,x0s − Y i,m;0,x0s |2 +
∫ T
0
|Zi,n;0,x0r − Zi,m;0,x0r |2dr
]
≤ CE{ ǫ2
2
∫ T
0
(|Zi,n;0,x0r |+ |Zi,m;0,x0r |)2dr +
ǫ4
4
∫ T
0
(1 + |X0,x0r |)4dr
+
1
4ǫ8
∫ T
0
|Y i,n;0,x0r − Y i,m;0,x0r |4dr
}
+
1
2
E
[
sup
r∈[0,T ]
|Y i,n;0,x0r − Y i,m;0,x0r |2
]
+ 2E
[ ∫ T
0
|Zi,n;0,x0r − Zi,m;0,x0r |2dr
]
,
which implies,
lim sup
n,m→∞
E
[
sup
s∈[0,T ]
|Y i,n;0,x0s − Y i,m;0,x0s |2
]
= 0,
since ǫ is arbitrary and the facts of (2.12), (2.38), (2.35) and (2.29)-(c). Thus the
sequence of processes (Y i,n;0,x0)n≥1 converges in S2T (R) to Y i for i = 1, 2 which are
continuous processes.
To summarize this step, we have the following results (at least for a subsequence
{n}): for i = 1, 2,
(2.39)

(a) Hni (s, y) ∈ Lq([0, T ]×R; µ(0, x0; s, dy)ds) uniformly w.r.t. n;
(b) Y i,n;0,x0 →n→∞ Y i in Lα([0, T ]×R, ds⊗ dP) for any α ≥ 1, besides,
Y i,n;0,x0 →n→∞ Y i in S2T (R);
(c) Zi,n;0,x0 →n→∞ Zi in L2([0, T ]×R, ds⊗ dP), additionally, there exists a
subsequence {n} s.t Zi,n;0,x0 →n→∞ Zi ds⊗ dP− a.e. and
sup
n≥1
|Zi,n;0,x0 | ∈ L2([0, T ]×R, ds⊗ dP).
Step 4 : Convergence of (Hni )n≥1, i = 1, 2.
In this step, we are going to define the processes (θs)s≤T and (ϑs)s≤T and verify
that (Y i, Zi), i = 1, 2, and θ, ϑ satisfy (2.11). We demonstrate first for i = 1. Let us
consider the subsequence which satisfies (2.39).
Recall (2.24) for (t, x) = (0, x0) which reads as: For any s ∈ [t, T ],
Hn1 (s,X
0,x0
s ) = Φn(Z
1,n;0,x0
s )Φn(f(s,X
0,x0
s )) + Φn(Z
1,n;0,x0
s u¯(Z
1,n;0,x0
s ))
+ Φn(Z
1,n;0,x0
s )v¯
n(Z2,n;0,x0s ).
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Note that,
Φn(Z
1,n;0,x0
s )Φn(f(s,X
0,x0
s )) + Φn(Z
1,n;0,x0
s u¯(Z
1,n;0,x0
s ))
→n→∞ Z1sf(s,X0,x0s ) + Z1s u¯(Z1s ), ds⊗ dP-a.e.
since Z1,n;0,x0 →n→∞ Z1, ds ⊗ dP-a.e. as stated in (2.39)-(c), Φn(x) →n→∞ x and
finally by the continuity of p ∈ R 7→ pu¯(p). This convergence holds also in H1T (R), by
Lebesgue’s dominated convergence theorem, since the process (supn≥1 |Z1,n;0,x0s |)s∈[t,T ]
belongs to H2T (R), f is of linear growth and u¯ is uniformly bounded. The rest part
in (2.40) is
Φn(Z
1,n;0,x0
s )v¯
n(Z2,n;0,x0s )
= Φn(Z
1,n;0,x0
s )v¯
n(Z2,n;0,x0s )1{Z2s 6=0} +Φn(Z
1,n;0,x0
s )v¯
n(Z2,n;0,x0s )1{Z2s=0}.
But
Φn(Z
1,n;0,x0
s )v¯
n(Z2,n;0,x0s )1{Z2s 6=0} →n→∞ Z1s v¯(Z2s )1{Z2s 6=0} ds⊗ dP-a.e.
since for any z 6= 0, if n is large enough then v¯n(z′) = v¯(z′) if z′ ∈ (z − a, z + a) ⊂
(−∞, 0)∪(0,+∞) for small a > 0 and v¯ is continuous in z. Once more the convergence
holds in H2T (R), by Lebesgue’s dominated convergence theorem, since the process
(supn≥1 |Z1,n;0,x0s |)s∈[t,T ] belongs to H2T (R) and v¯n is uniformly bounded.
To proceed let us define a P-measurable process (ϑs)s≤T valued on V as the weak
limit in H2T (R) of some subsequence (v¯nk(Z2,nk;0,x0)1{Z2=0})k≥0. The weak limit
exists since (v¯nk)k≥0 is bounded. Let now τ be an arbitrary stopping time such that
τ ∈ [0, T ], P− a.s., then
∫ τ
0
Φnk(Z
1,nk;0,x0
s )v¯
nk(Z2,nk;0,x0s )1{Z2s=0}ds
→k→∞
∫ τ
0
Z1sϑs1{Z2s=0}ds weakly in L
2(Ω, dP).
Indeed ∫ τ
0
Φnk(Z
1,nk;0,x0
s )v¯
nk(Z2,nk;0,x0s )1{Z2s=0}ds
=
∫ τ
0
(Φnk(Z
1,nk;0,x0
s )− Z1s )v¯nk(Z2,nk;0,x0s )1{Z2s=0}ds
+
∫ τ
0
Z1s v¯
nk(Z2,nk;0,x0s )1{Z2s=0}ds.
On the right side, the first integral converges to 0 in L2(dP) by Lebesgue’s domi-
nated convergence theorem since Φnk(Z
1,nk;0,x0)→ Z1 dt⊗ dP-a.e., supk≥0 |Z1,nkt | ∈
L2([0, T ]×R) as shown in (2.39)-(c), Z1 ∈ L2([0, T ]×R), the sequence (v¯nk)k≥0 is
bounded and |Φnk(x)| ≤ |x|, ∀x ∈ R. Below, we will give the weak convergence in
L2(Ω, dP) of the integral
∫ τ
0
Z1s v¯
nk(Z2,nk;0,x0s )1{Z2s=0}ds to
∫ τ
0
Z1sϑs1{Z2s=0}ds. That
is, for any random variable ξ ∈ L2(Ω,FT , dP), we need to show,
(2.40) E[ξ
∫ τ
0
Z1s v¯
nk(Z2,nk;0,x0s )1{Z2s=0}ds]→k→∞ E[ξ
∫ τ
0
Z1sϑs1{Z2s=0}ds].
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Thanks to martingale representation theorem, there exists a process (Λs)s≤T ∈ H2T (R)
such that, E[ξ|Fτ ] = E[ξ] +
∫ τ
0 ΛsdBs. Therefore,
E
[
ξ
∫ τ
0
Z1s v¯
nk(Z2,nk;0,x0s )1{Z2s=0}ds
]
= E
[
E
[
ξ
∫ τ
0
Z1s v¯
nk(Z2,nk;0,x0s )1{Z2s=0}ds|Fτ ]
]
= E
[
E[ξ|Fτ ] ·
∫ τ
0
Z1s v¯
nk(Z2,nk;0,x0s )1{Z2s=0}ds
]
= E
[
E[ξ]
∫ τ
0
Z1s v¯
nk(Z2,nk;0,x0s )1{Z2s=0}ds
]
+E
[ ∫ τ
0
ΛsdBs ·
∫ τ
0
Z1s v¯
nk(Z2,nk;0,x0s )1{Z2s=0}ds
]
.
Notice that E[ξ]E[
∫ τ
0 Z
1
s v¯
nk(Z2,nk;0,x0s )1{Z2s=0}ds] →k→∞ E[ξ]E[
∫ τ
0 Z
1
sϑs1{Z2s=0}ds],
since (Z1s )s≤T ∈ H2T (R) and v¯nk(Z2,nk;0,x0s )1{Z2s=0} →k→∞ ϑs weakly in H2T (R).
Next, by Itô’s formula,
E[
∫ τ
0
ΛsdBs ·
∫ τ
0
Z1s v¯
nk(Z2,nk;0,x0s )1{Z2s=0}ds]
= E[
∫ τ
0
( ∫ s
0
ΛudBu
)
Z1s v¯
nk(Z2,nk;0,x0s )1{Z2s=0}ds]+
+E[
∫ τ
0
( ∫ s
0
Z1uv¯
nk(Z2,nk;0,x0u )1{Z2u=0}du
)
ΛsdBs].
The latter one on the right side is 0, since
∫ .
0(
∫ s
0 Z
1
uv¯
nk(Z2,nk;0,x0u )1{Z2u=0}du)ΛsdBs
is an Ft-martingale which is followed by (Z1s )s≤T ∈ H2T (R), (Λs)s≤T ∈ H2T (R) and
the boundness of v¯nk and then
E[{∫ T
0
| ∫ s
0
Z1uv¯
nk(Z2,nk;0,x0u )1{Z2u=0}du|2|Λs|2ds}
1
2 ] < ∞. For the former part, let us
denote
∫ s
0 ΛudBu by ψs for any s ∈ [0, τ ]. Then for any integer κ > 0, we have,
|E[
∫ τ
0
ψsZ
1
s
(
v¯nk(Z2,nks )1{Z2s=0} − ϑs
)
ds]|
= |E[
∫ τ
0
ψsZ
1
s
(
v¯nk(Z2,nk;0,x0s )1{Z2s=0} − ϑs
)
1{|ψsZ1s |≤κ}ds]|+
+ |E[
∫ τ
0
ψsZ
1
s
(
v¯nk(Z2,nk;0,x0s )1{Z2s=0} − ϑs
)
1{|ψsZ1s |>κ}ds]|.
On the right side of the above equation, the first component converges to 0 which
is the consequence of v¯nk(Z2,nk;0,x0s )1{Z2s=0} →k→∞ ϑs weakly in H2T (R). For the
second term, considering both (v¯nk(Z2,nk;0,x0s ))s≤τ and (ϑs)s≤τ are bounded, it is
smaller than C|E[∫ τ0 |ψsZ1s |1{|ψsZ1s |≥κ}ds]| which obviously converges to 0 as κ→∞.
Thus (2.40) holds true.
Finally, we also have
(2.41)
∫ τ
0
Z1,nk;0,x0s dBs →k→∞
∫ τ
0
Z1sdBs in L
2(Ω, dP),
which is obtained from the convergence of (Z1,nk;0,x0)k≥0 to Z1 in H2T (R).
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Then by observing the approximation BSDE (2.21) in a forward way, i.e. for any
stopping time τ ,
Y 1,nk;0,x0τ = Y
1,nk;0,x0
0 −
∫ τ
0
Hnk1 (s,X
0,x0
s )ds+
∫ τ
0
Z1,nk;0,x0s dBs,
combining with the convergence of (Y 1,nk;0,x0)k≥0 to Y 1 in S2T (R) we infer that
P-a.s., Y 1τ = Y
1
0 −
∫ τ
0
H∗1 (s,X
0,x0
s , Z
1
s , Z
2
s , ϑs)ds+
∫ τ
0
Z1sdBs
since∫ τ
0
Hnk1 (s,X
0,x0
s )ds ⇀k→∞
∫ τ
0
H∗1 (s,X
0,x0
s , Z
1
s , Z
2
s , ϑs)ds weakly in L
2(Ω, dP).
As τ is arbitrary then the processes Y 1 and Y 10 −
∫ ·
0 H
∗
1 (s,X
0,x0
s , Z
1
s , Z
2
s , ϑs)ds +∫ ·
0
Z1sdBs are indistinguishable, i.e., P-a.s.
∀s ≤ T, Y 1s = Y 10 −
∫ s
0
H∗1 (r,X
0,x0
r , Z
1
r , Z
2
r , ϑr)dr +
∫ s
0
Z1rdBr.
On the other hand, Y 1T = g1(X
0,x0
T ), then,
P-a.s., ∀s ≤ T, Y 1s = g1(X0,x0T ) +
∫ T
s
H∗1 (r,X
0,x0
r , Z
1
r , Z
2
r , ϑr)dr −
∫ T
s
Z1rdBr.
Similarly, for player π2, there exists a P-measurable process (θs)s≤T valued on U ,
which is obtained in the same way as previously as a weak limit of a subsequence of
(u¯n(Z1,n;0,x0s )1{Z1s 6=0})s≤T in H2T (R) such that
P-a.s., ∀s ≤ T, Y 2s = g2(X0,x0T ) +
∫ T
s
H∗2 (r,X
0,x0
r , Z
1
r , Z
2
r , θr)dr −
∫ T
s
Z2rdBr.
The proof is completed. 
3. Generalizations. In this Section, we are going to deal with some generaliza-
tions of Theorem 2.6 in the following three aspects:
(i) For the drift term Γ in SDE (2.4) which reads,
Γ(t, x, u, v) = f(t, x) + u+ v, u ∈ [0, 1] and v ∈ [−1, 1],
one can replace:
(a) [0, 1] and [−1, 1] with arbitrary closed bounded intervals ;
(b) u (resp. v) of Γ with h(u) (resp. ℓ(v)) where h and ℓ are continuous functions
defined on U = [a, b] and V = [c, d] respectively. In this case U ′ = h(U) and V ′ = ℓ(V )
are also bounded closed intervals. The Nash equilibrium point (u¯, v¯) exists and is still
of bang-bang type. The unique difference is that, it will jump between the bound of
set U ′ (resp. V ′) instead of U (resp. V ). 
(ii) As we indicated in Remark 2.1, the dynamics of the process Xt,x of (2.1) may
contain a diffusion term σ(t, x) (see equation (3.1)) which is a function defined as:
(t, x) ∈ [0, T ]×R 7→ σ(t, x) ∈ R,
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with the following assumption:
Assumption (A1): The function σ(t, x) is uniformly Lipschitz w.r.t. x, it is invert-
ible and bounded and its inverse is bounded.
Under (A1), for any (t, x) ∈ [0, T ]×R, the following SDE
(3.1) Xt,xs = x+
∫ s
t
σ(r,Xt,xr )dBr, ∀s ∈ [t, T ] and Xt,xs = x for s ∈ [0, t],
has a unique solution (see e.g. Karatzas and Shreve, pp.289, [25]). Moreover σ satisfies
the uniform elliptic condition, i.e. there exists a constant Υ > 0 such that for any
(t, x) ∈ [0, T ]×R, Υ ≤ σ(t, x)2 ≤ Υ−1.
In this framework, the Hamiltonian functions associated with the NZSDG of payoffs
given by (2.5) are defined from [0, T ]×R×R× U × V into R by:
H1(t, x, p, u, v) := pσ
−1(t, x)Γ(t, x, u, v) = pσ−1(t, x)(f(t, x) + u+ v);
H2(t, x, q, u, v) := qσ
−1(t, x)Γ(t, x, u, v) = qσ−1(t, x)(f(t, x) + u+ v).
Noticing that σ−1 is bounded, it follows by the generalized Isaacs’ condition (2.8) and
the same approach in this article that, the Nash equilibrium point exists and is of
bang-bang type.
Actually we should point out that, all the results in this article will hold by the same
techniques in this case (ii) with only some minor adaptions, except the convergence to
0 of the second term on the right side of inequality (2.32) which needs to be checked
carefully. Indeed the objective is to show that
(3.2) |E[∫ Tt+δ(Hni (s,Xt,xs )−Hmi (s,Xt,xs )) · 1{|Xt,xs |≤k}ds]∣∣→n,m→∞ 0.
for fixed (t, x) and k. To begin with we give the following result related to domination
of laws of the process Xt,x.
Lemma 3.1. (Lq-Domination) Let t ∈ [0, T ] and x, x0 ∈ R. For s ∈ [t, T ], we
denote by µ(t, x; s, dy) the law of Xt,xs . Under Assumption (A1) on σ, for any q¯ ∈
(1,∞), the family of laws {µ(t, x; s, dy), s ∈ (t, T ]} is Lq¯-dominated by {µ(0, x0; s, dy), s ∈
(t, T ]}, i.e., for any δ ∈ (0, T − t), there exists an application φδt,x,x0 : [t+ δ, T ]×R→
R
+ such that:
(a) µ(t, x; s, dy)ds = φδt,x,x0(s, y)µ(0, x0; s, dy)ds for any (s, y) ∈ [t+ δ, T ]×R;
(b) ∀k ≥ 1, φδt,x,x0(s, y) ∈ Lq¯([t+ δ, T ]× [−k, k]; µ(0, x0; s, dy)ds).
Proof. Readers are referred to [20] (Section 28, pp.123) and [23] (Lemma 4.3 and
Corollary 4.4, pp.14-15) for the proof of this Lemma. However basically it uses the
Aronson estimates [1] for densities of the laws of the solution of SDE (3.1) under
Assumption (A1).
Proof of convergence (3.2): Thanks to Lemma 3.1, there exists a function φδt,x,x0 :
[t+ δ, T ]×R → R+ such that:
(3.3) ∀k ≥ 1, φδt,x,x0(s, y) ∈ L
q
q−1 ([t+ δ, T ]× [−k, k]; µ(0, x0; s, dy)ds).
Then
|E[ ∫ Tt+δ(Hni (s,Xt,xs )−Hmi (s,Xt,xs )) · 1{|Xt,xs |≤k}ds]∣∣
= | ∫
R
∫ T
t+δ(H
n
i (s, y)−Hmi (s, y)) · 1{|y|≤k}µ(t, x; s, dy)ds|
= | ∫
R
∫ T
t+δ
(Hni (s, y)−Hmi (s, y)) · 1{|y|≤k}φδt,x,x0(s, y)µ(0, x0; s, dy)ds|.
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The constant q in (3.3) is the one which makes that Hni (s, y)→n→∞ Hi(s, y) weakly
in Lq([0, T ]×R; µ(0, x0; s, dy)ds) for i = 1, 2 and a fixed q ∈ (1, 2). Then combining
this weak convergence result and (3.3) yields (3.2). 
(iii) In the same way one can deal with the multi-dimensional case for diffusion
processes Xt,x satisfying (3.1) when σ(t, x) verifies Assumption (A1). 
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